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I. INTRODUCTION
Marcie was a loving mother and a hard worker. But all of this was
stripped away in an instant. Marcie lost both her daughter and her ability to
work after being struck while walking home from school by a negligent
driver. The resulting injuries have required several surgeries. With more
operations necessary in the future, Marcie will likely require a lifetime of
medical care. Marcie’s employer provided her health insurance coverage.
Unfortunately, when she lost her job because of the injuries, she lost her
insurance as well. Due to her present condition and dearth of income, she
is unable to afford the high premiums of private insurance.
Marcie lives in West Palm Beach, Florida. She hired a lawyer to sue the
driver. Her complaint demands the cost of her past and future medical care.
While insured, Marcie enjoyed the benefit of discounted medical costs
stemming from an agreement between her HMO and her health care
provider.1 Now, without insurance, the costs of future medical care will not
be discounted and Marcie will face larger, retail2 costs for the same care.
Her attorney wants to present evidence at trial of the retail cost of her past
care to establish the “reasonable value” of care in the future.3 However, he
is concerned that the jury may never see these retail costs because some
judges across the state are allowing the costs to be admitted into evidence
while others are not.4 If the jury does not see the retail costs, Marcie may
not see them reflected in her recovery. She may, in effect, be penalized for
past benefits she no longer enjoys.
Marcie is a hypothetical plaintiff and her attorney is a hypothetical
attorney. However, there are many real “Marcies” currently facing this
problem. There are also many real attorneys who share the concerns of
Marcie’s attorney.5 These concerns have led attorneys to establish an email list manager to share information about exactly what evidence a
1. As an example, her first surgery was billed to her insurance carrier for $10,000, but the
doctor accepted $3,000 from the carrier in full satisfaction of the debt.
2. For the purpose of this Note, retail is synonymous with pre-discount, billed costs of care.
3. See, e.g., Goble v. Frohman, 901 So. 2d 830, 835 (Fla. 2005) (Lewis, J., concurring in
result only); Coop. Leasing, Inc. v. Johnson, 872 So. 2d 956, 958 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
4. See infra Part V.
5. See, e.g., Interview with Mariano Garcia, Partner, Gonzalez & Garcia (Jan. 15, 2010) (on
file with author); Interview with Spencer Kuvin, Partner, Leopold & Kuvin (Jan. 19, 2010) (on file
with author); Interview with Nancy La Vista, Attorney, Lytal, Reiter Clark Fountain & Williams
(Jan. 15, 2010) (on file with author); Interview with William H. Pincus, Law Offices of William H.
Pincus (Jan. 18, 2010) (on file with author); Interview with Jeffrey R. Rollins, Attorney, Steinger,
Iscoe & Greene, P.A. (Jan. 16, 2010) (on file with author).
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particular judge will allow.6 Prior to entering a courtroom, they will use the
listserv to ask, “I am in front of Judge X. Does he follow Goble or
Thyssenkrupp?”7 The question refers to the Second District Court of
Appeal’s decision in Goble v. Frohman8 and the Fourth District Court of
Appeal’s decision in Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp. v. Lasky.9
Both Goble and Thyssenkrupp addressed the value of negotiated
discounts between health care providers and insurance providers as
“collateral source contributions” under Florida Statutes § 768.76.10 The
statute both defines “collateral sources” and mandates that the value of
such contributions be reduced from a damage award11 to prevent excess
recovery, or “double recovery,” by plaintiffs.12 Both courts held that these
discounts were properly set off from plaintiff awards.13 Both courts agreed
that the statute operates as both a rule of law and a rule of evidence.14
However, the courts conflict regarding how to apply the statute as a rule
of evidence. In Goble, the court held that the jury should see evidence of
the undiscounted, billed costs.15 In Thyssenkrupp, the court held that the
jury should not see evidence of the undiscounted, billed costs.16 The key
difference in the two cases is that Goble addressed the issue in a claim
involving HMO coverage17 and Thyssenkrupp in a claim involving
Medicare coverage.18 This distinction renders each case correct based on
the plain reading of Florida Statute § 768.76, as discussed below.
However, the misapplication and extension of Thyssenkrupp outside the
6. Interview with Spencer Kuvin, Partner, Leopold & Kuvin (Dec. 8, 2009) (on file with
author).
7. Id.
8. Goble v. Frohman, 848 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
9. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp. v. Lasky, 868 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).
10. FLA. STAT. § 768.76 (2010); Thyssenkrupp, 868 So. 2d at 549–50; Goble, 848 So. 2d at
408–10.
11. FLA. STAT. § 768.76(1), (2)(a) (2010).
12. See, e.g., Pollo Operations, Inc. v. Tripp, 906 So. 2d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005);
Goble, 848 So. 2d at 408–09 (establishing that the statute was created to “‘ensure that injured
persons recover reasonable damages,’” “‘to encourage the settlement of civil actions prior to trial’”
and to prevent plaintiffs from a “double recovery.”(quoting Tort Reform and Insurance Act, ch. 86–
160, 1986 Fla. Laws 699)). It is important to note that the Tripp court explained Medicare’s
exclusion under the statute because Florida’s collateral source rule is preempted by the supremacy
of the federal Medicare statute. The court also pointed out that “any judgment the plaintiff
receive[d] which included the amounts paid by Medicare would still be subject to a lien.” Tripp,
906 So. 2d at 1104 n.4.
13. Thyssenkrupp, 868 So. 2d at 550; Goble, 848 So. 2d at 410.
14. Thyssenkrupp, 868 So. 2d at 550–51 (Farmer, C.J., reh’g denied); Goble, 848 So. 2d at
410 (citing Gormley v. GTE Prods. Corp., 587 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla.1991)).
15. Goble, 848 So. 2d at 410 (affirming the trial court’s exclusion of evidence regarding
collateral source benefits).
16. Thyssenkrupp, 868 So. 2d at 550.
17. Goble, 848 So. 2d at 407.
18. Thyssenkrupp, 868 So. 2d at 548.
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Medicare context has resulted in a clear conflict among the courts.19
Once an individual has Medicare, she will never lose it. Thus, an
injured plaintiff receiving Medicare will forever enjoy the benefit of
discounts in future costs of care.20 The same cannot be said of private
insurance.21 An injured plaintiff like Marcie who has lost her private
insurance will face higher costs of care in the future without the benefit of
discounts.22 Thus, § 768.76 rightfully results in a discounted award for
future medical damages where future aid is guaranteed, such as Medicare,
but not where future aid is not guaranteed, such as in private insurance. In
cases like Marcie’s, the proper application of § 768.76 post-trial results in
no risk at all of a “double recovery” because Marcie will no longer receive
an undiscounted, future damage award while only paying a discounted
future medical rates via her insurer since, after all, she has lost her health
insurance.23
Moreover, precluding Marcie from presenting the undiscounted, billed
costs of past care to the jury may create a bias against her when the jury is
asked to determine her future costs of care in a damage award.24 Simply
put, although able to introduce expert testimony and other relevant
evidence to establish the reasonable value of future care,25 when Marcie’s
attorney asks the jury to award $60,000 for her next surgery, the response
may be, “Why $60,000 when the bill for her last surgery was only
$6,000?”
Florida’s longstanding law is that future damage awards are not to be
reduced due to collateral source contributions.26 This principle has been
19. Id. at 551 n.1 (Farmer, C.J., reh’g denied) (“One could argue there is no conflict with
Goble . . . which involved HMO benefits rather than Medicare. To the extent that HMO benefits
and Medicare benefits are interchangeable for this subject, however, we certify conflict.”).
20. See
Medicare.gov,
Medicare
Eligibility
Tool
(General
Enrollment),
http://www.medicare.gov/MedicareEligibility/Home.asp?dest=NAV|Home|GeneralEnrollment#
TabTop (last visited Sept. 22, 2010).
21. See generally NAYLA KAZZI, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, MORE AMERICANS ARE LOSING
HEALTH INSURANCE EVERY DAY: AN ANALYSIS OF HEALTH COVERAGE LOSSES DURING THE
RECESSION (2009), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/05/pdf/healthinsur
ancelosses.pdf (discussing the markedly high number of employees who lost private health
insurance when they lost their jobs).
22. See generally Alan T. Sorensen, Insurer-Hospital Bargaining: Negotiated Discounts in
Post-Deregulation Connecticut, 51 J. INDUS. ECON. 469, 469 (2003).
23. Pollo Operations, Inc. v. Tripp, 906 So. 2d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA. 2005).
24. See generally Interview with Mariano Garcia, Partner, Gonzalez & Garcia (Jan. 15, 2010)
(on file with author); Interview with Spencer Kuvin, Partner, Leopold & Kuvin (Jan. 19, 2010) (on
file with author); Interview with Nancy La Vista, Attorney, Lytal, Reiter Clark Fountain and
Williams (Jan. 15, 2010) (on file with author); Interview with William H. Pincus, Law Offices of
William H. Pincus (Jan. 18, 2010) (on file with author); Interview with Jeffrey R. Rollins, Attorney,
Steinger, Iscoe & Greene, P.A. (Jan. 16, 2010) (on file with author).
25. FLA. STAT. §§ 90.401–.402 (2010) (establishing relevance of evidence).
26. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rudnick, 706 So. 2d 389, 390–91 (Fla.4th DCA 1998) (“[I]n
order to have collateral source benefits set off against an award, those benefits must either be
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applied to cases involving private insurance,27 workers’ compensation
insurance,28 personal injury protection (PIP) insurance,29 and even
Medicare30 and Medicaid.31 As stated by the Fifth District Court of Appeal,
“The statute does not purport to benefit the tortfeasor by deducting
collateral sources to which the insured may be entitled in the future.”32
Plaintiff attorneys facing this issue believe that courts improperly applying
Thyssenkrupp in non-Medicare cases are endorsing de facto reductions in
future damages by preventing the jury from properly evaluating the
reasonable value of future care.33
This issue remains unsettled by the Florida Supreme Court.34 Without
such guidance from the supreme court, lower courts are misapplying the
holdings of Thyssenkrupp to non-Medicare cases.35 As the Thyssenkrupp
court properly found, Medicare benefits are specifically excluded as
collateral sources.36 In light of that, it is improper to apply the
Thyssenkrupp standard to those collateral sources that are statutorily
defined by and fall within the post-trial restrictions of § 768.76, such as
non-Medicare sources of assistance. Nonetheless, attorneys are seizing on
the confusion and absorbing the courts’ time with motions arguing each
side.37 The result is that where Goble is not controlling,38 lower courts are
choosing, ad hoc, whether to follow Goble and admit the undiscounted,
billed amount or to follow Thyssenkrupp and admit only the discounted
amount into evidence.39 Across the state, some courts are applying the
already paid . . . or presently earned and currently due and owing . . . .” (citing White v. Westlund,
624 So. 2d 1148, 1153 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993))); Measom v. Rainbow Connection Preschool, Inc.,
568 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla.5th DCA 1990).
27. Rudnick, 706 So. 2d at 390–91.
28. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. McDermott, 929 So. 2d 1114, 1117–18 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).
29. Pizzarelli v. Rollins, 704 So. 2d 630, 633 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
30. Grell v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 3:05-cv-1237-J-32HTS, 2007 WL 1362728, at *3 (M.D.
Fla. May 7, 2007) (citing Rudnick, 761 So. 2d at 390).
31. Bravo v. United States, 403 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1199 n.13 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (noting that no
set off for future Medicaid payments is permitted under Florida law).
32. Measom v. Rainbow Connection Preschool, Inc., 568 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. 5th DCA
1990).
33. Interview with Spencer Kuvin, Partner, Leopold & Kuvin (Dec. 8, 2009) (on file with
author).
34. Goble v. Frohman, 901 So. 2d 830, 833 (Fla. 2005) (limiting the holding to whether
discounts qualify as “collateral sources” and not ruling on the statute as a rule of evidence).
35. See infra Part V.
36. FLA. STAT. § 768.76(2)(b) (2010).
37. See infra Part VI.B.
38. That area includes anywhere outside of the Second Judicial District of Florida.
39. Compare Order Granting Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Limit Medical Expenses
Introduced Into Evidence at 1, Stone v. Univ. of Fla. Bd. of Trs., No. 01-05-CA-4098 K (Fla. 8th
Cir. Ct. Oct. 16, 2009), and Omnibus Order on Motions in Limine at 5, Slavin v. Mount Sinai Med.
Ctr., No. 06-954 CA 11 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Feb. 23, 2009) (excluding billed costs), and Order on
Defendant’s Motions in Limine at 1, Young v. Gray, No. 03-CA 8295 A (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Nov. 14,
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latter, without distinguishing Medicare from private insurance.40
To resolve the confusion, clarification of Florida Statutes § 768.76 as a
rule of evidence is necessary. Part II of this Note will provide a history of
the collateral source doctrine, including some of the ways it has been
abrogated by courts and state legislatures. Part III will discuss Florida’s
abrogation of the common law rule with the enactment of § 768.76. This
will include a plain reading of the language most applicable to this topic.
Part IV will analyze the decisions in Goble I, Thyssenkrupp, and Goble II
to set the background for why there are different evidentiary standards
being applied in the lower courts. Part V will provide accounts from
practitioners who are seeing this issue play out in the courts. These
accounts offer unique insight into the issue. This Part will also analyze the
orders and thoughts of judges who have given salient justifications for
following Goble and nonetheless apply Thyssenkrupp. Part VI will contrast
whether clarification would be better provided by the Florida Legislature
amending the statute or the Florida Supreme Court clarifying the
application of the present statutory language. Part VII will discuss Florida’s
status as a “reasonable value” jurisdiction, its history of refusing to reduce
awards of future damages, and other evidentiary issues pertinent to the
present conflict. Finally, Part VIII analyzes and distinguishes two recent
decisions from the supreme courts of Ohio and Kansas which pose a
different solution than that found in either Goble or Thyssenkrupp.
This Note will argue that where no other statute conflicts,41 the plain
language of Florida Statutes § 786.76 clearly vests exclusive power in “the
court”42 to set off the contributions from collateral sources, post-award.43
Therefore, the correct evidentiary standard in cases involving statutorily
defined “collateral sources” is that endorsed by the Goble court: excluding
such evidence until after a jury determination of damages.44 Without
allowing the billed costs into evidence, there will be no need for “the
court” to reduce awards and the statutory text will be meaningless, lacking
form and substance. Marcie’s jury should see the retail, undiscounted,
billed costs of her past care as evidence of the “reasonable value” of her
future care.

2005) (excluding billed costs), with Order on Defendants’ First Motion in Limine, Stratton v.
Comcast of Greater Fla./Ga., Inc., No. 16-2007-CA-007154 (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 2009)
(allowing billed costs), and Order on Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine Regarding Admission of Medical
Bills Into Evidence, Muentes v. Auerbach, No. 2003-CA-004105-AJ (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Aug. 2,
2005) (allowing billed costs), and Order on KLI’s Motion in Limine Relating to Medical Bills,
Wood v. KLI, Inc., No. 03-923 CA (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. May 1, 2005) (allowing billed costs).
40. See supra note 39.
41. See infra Part III.A.
42. See infra Part III.C.
43. See infra Part III.B.
44. Goble v. Frohman, 848 So. 2d 406, 410 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
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II. THE COMMON LAW COLLATERAL SOURCE DOCTRINE: FROM
INCEPTION TO ABROGATION
Some of the most renowned legal economists regard the collateral
source doctrine as an efficient element of the common law.45 Although not
the first case on record addressing the concept, many consider Propeller
Monticello v. Mollison46 to be the “seminal” case on the topic.47 In
Mollison, the U.S. Supreme Court held that no defense may be founded on
the fact that insurers had already paid for damages incurred by the
plaintiff.48 The Mollison Court stated that this was a “doctrine well
established at common law.”49 This doctrine placed a bar on any evidence
of contributions or reimbursements to the plaintiff being introduced to
reduce the liability of a tortfeasor.50 For more than a century, this rule was
consistently applied in the lower courts across the nation.51 Justifications
for maintaining the rule included: (1) not providing a tortfeasor with the
benefit of the plaintiff’s bargain with an insurer,52 (2) not punishing a
responsible plaintiff for carrying insurance,53 (3) providing a deterrence
mechanism,54 and (4) promoting a public policy against a windfall to a
tortfeasor.55
As a creature of common law,56 the doctrine was subject to
modification at the discretion of state legislatures. It remained almost
universally unaltered until the 1980s, when many states began abrogating
the doctrine through legislation aimed at combating a trend of rising
damage awards, specifically in medical malpractice claims.57 These awards
45. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 199–200 (7th ed. 2007)
(stating that the possibility of double recovery is secondary to the need for the full cost of negligent
behavior be imposed on tortfeasors to encourage the proper level of care to be taken).
46. 58 U.S. 152 (1854).
47. Guillermo Gabriel Zorogastua, Comment, Improperly Divorced from Its Roots: The
Rationales of the Collateral Source Rule and Their Implications for Medicare and Medicaid Writeoffs, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 463, 475–76 (2007) (citing Douglas H. Schwartz, Comment, The Tortured
Path of Ohio’s Collateral Source Rule, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 643, 643 (1997)).
48. Mollison, 58 U.S. at 155.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Urbanak v. Hinde, 497 So. 2d 276, 277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
51. Deborah Van Meter, Comment, Louisiana’s Collateral Source Rule: Time for a Change?,
32 LOY. L. REV. 978, 980–82 (1987).
52. Amwest Sav. Ass’n v. Statewide Capital, Inc., 144 F.3d 885, 889 (5th Cir. 1998).
53. Green v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 59 F.3d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing
Quinones v. Pa. Gen. Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1167, 1171 (10th Cir. 1986)).
54. Bozeman v. State, 879 So. 2d 692, 700 (La. 2004).
55. Green, 59 F.3d at 1032 (citing FDIC v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 20 F.3d 1070, 1083 (10th
Cir. 1994)).
56. See generally Zorogastua, supra note 47 (discussing the common law roots of the
collateral source rule).
57. See In re E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 772 F. Supp. 1380, 1384 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y.
1991) (commenting on the statutory reform which swept the country in the 1980s); see also Jennifer
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were viewed as creating a “crisis” in the health care and health insurance
industries.58 Litigants have raised equal protection challenges to legislation
mandating different rules based on different collateral sources in different
types of cases.59 These challenges have been generally unsuccessful with
courts largely justifying their rulings based on deference to the
legislature.60
Another method of abrogation allows for evidence of collateral sources
based on the subrogation rights, or right to reimbursement, of the source.61
By allowing evidence of these collateral source contributions into evidence
and not reducing their value from a plaintiff’s award, the plaintiff will be
able to recover an amount sufficient to satisfy any existing liens.62 At the
same time, where the plaintiff is under no obligation to remit any portion
of her recovery, a large award may create a windfall for the plaintiff.63
Based on the same “windfall” logic, other methods of abrogation have
included establishing “benefit of the bargain” or “actual amount paid”
standards.64 Under the “benefit of the bargain” approach, courts “allow
plaintiffs who have private insurance to recover the full amount of their
medical expenses because they have bargained for the benefits they
received.”65 Under the less plaintiff-friendly “actual amount paid”
approach, responsible plaintiffs who carry insurance may not recover any
Howard, Alabama’s New Collateral Source Rule: Observations from the Plaintiff’s Perspective, 32
CUMB. L. REV. 573, 573, 575 (2002) (discussing Alabama as an example); Chandler Gregg,
Comment, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: A Problem with No Answer, 70 MO. L. REV. 307, 307–
12 (2005); Zorogastua, supra note 47, at 478 (discussing Kansas as an example).
58. See L. Timothy Perrin, Comment, The Collateral Source Rule in Texas: Its Impending
Demise and a Proposed Modification, 18 TEX. TECH L. REV. 961, 961 (1987); Julie A. Schafer,
Note, The Constitutionality of Offsetting Collateral Benefits Under Ohio Revised Code Section
2317.45, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 587, 587 (1992).
59. See, e.g., Marsh v. Green. 782 So. 2d 223, 231–33 (Ala. 2000) (holding the challenged
Alabama abrogation statute constitutional); Smith v. Dep’t of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1095
(Fla.1987) (holding some portions of Florida’s Tort Reform and Insurance Act constitutional and
others unconstitutional).
60. See, e.g., Green, 782 So. 2d at 231.
61. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 9.17.070 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-225a (2010); FLA.
STAT. § 768.76 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1606 (2010); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1205 (2009);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2906 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-06 (West
2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6303 (2010); MINN. STAT. § 548.251 (2010); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 27-1-308 (2009); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4545 (McKinney 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-06 (2009);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-12 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-405 (2010).
62. See supra note 61.
63. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp. v. Lasky, 868 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
(“Allowing the admission of evidence of the excess discharged . . . has the effect of ‘provid[ing] an
undeserved and unnecessary windfall to the plaintiff.’” (quoting Fla. Physician’s Ins. Reciprocal v.
Stanley, 452 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla.1984))).
64. See Wills v. Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1025–29 (Ill. 2008) (providing in-depth discussion
of the different standards of recovery across many jurisdictions).
65. Id. at 1026.
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amounts “written off” by the health care provider from negotiated or
contractual discounts.66 Both of these approaches have been criticized for
“using the plaintiff’s relationship with a third party to measure the
tortfeasor’s liability.”67
Florida, like the majority of states,68 follows a “reasonable value”
approach under which the plaintiff may recover the reasonable value of
medical services.69 Many jurisdictions apply this standard without regard to
whether the contributions were made by private insurance or a
government-sponsored program, e.g., Medicare.70 Florida, however, has
chosen to limit the reasonable value to the actual amount paid when a
government-sponsored program such as Medicare is at issue.71
The Florida Legislature codified the state’s abrogation of the common
law doctrine72 in Florida Statutes § 768.76.73 The statute established the
standard by which collateral source contributions are to be set off from
damage awards.74 The question which remains unclear is how the statute
should operate as a rule of evidence—i.e., how, when, and by whom an
award will be reduced.
III. FLORIDA STATUTES § 768.76: A PLAIN READING
The Florida Legislature enacted Florida Statutes § 768.76 in 1986 “‘to
cure the current crisis’” in liability insurance.75 The statute reads as
follows:
(1) In any action to which this part applies in which liability
is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which
damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for losses
66. Id. at 1025.
67. Id. at 1027.
68. Id. at 1028.
69. Coop. Leasing, Inc. v. Johnson, 872 So. 2d 956, 958 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
70. See, e.g., Wills, 892 N.E.2d at 1029–31 (noting that Illinois follows the reasonable-value
approach, under which all plaintiffs are entitled to recover the full reasonable value of their medical
expenses, regardless of whether they have private insurance or are covered by a government
program).
71. FLA. STAT. § 768.76(2)(b) (2010) (defining Medicare and other public programs as
outside the collateral source statute); see also Coop. Leasing, Inc., 872 So. 2d at 960 (holding
Medicare discounted benefits are not recoverable in a damage award); Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp.
v. Lasky, 868 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (holding Medicare discounts not recoverable in
damages).
72. Goble v. Frohman, 901 So. 2d 830, 836 (Fla. 2005) (Lewis, J., concurring in result only)
(“Section 768.76 of the Florida Statutes abrogated the common law collateral source rule and
replaced it with a statutory provision . . . .”).
73. FLA. STAT. § 768.76 (2010).
74. Id.
75. Goble v. Frohman, 848 So. 2d 406, 408–09 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (quoting Tort Reform
and Insurance Act, ch. 86–160, 1986 Fla. Laws 699)).
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sustained, the court shall reduce the amount of such award by
the total of all amounts which have been paid for the benefit
of the claimant, or which are otherwise available to the
claimant, from all collateral sources. . . .76
It is axiomatic that “statutory language must be accorded its plain
meaning.”77 Therefore, any answer to the present question begins with a
plain reading and clear understanding of the following four phrases in the
first section of the statute: (1) “to which this part applies,” (2) “in which
damages are awarded,” (3) “the court shall,” and (4) “have been paid.”78
A. “To Which This Part Applies”
The beginning of the statute establishes both the scope of the statute
and its limitations. The statement “to which this part applies” is a
reference to Part II of Chapter 768, which encompasses §§ 768.71–
.81.79 The first section of Part II establishes that the Part is applicable
“‘[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided . . . to any action for
76. FLA. STAT. § 768.76(1) (2010) (emphasis added). The statute also reads:
(2) For purposes of this section:
(a) “Collateral sources” means any payments made to the claimant, or made
on the claimant’s behalf, by or pursuant to:
....
2. Any health, sickness, or income disability insurance; automobile accident
insurance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage; and any
other similar insurance benefits, . . . .
3. Any contract or agreement of any group, organization, partnership, or
corporation to provide, pay for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental,
or other health care services.
....
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, benefits received
under Medicare, . . . the Medicaid program . . . or from any medical services
program administered by the Department of Health shall not be considered a
collateral source.
Id. § 768.76(2) (emphasis added).
77. Pizzarelli v. Rollins, 704 So. 2d 630, 633 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“The law clearly holds
that unambiguous statutory language must be accorded its plain meaning.” (citing Carson v. Miller,
370 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 1979))).
78. FLA. STAT. § 768.76(1) (2010).
79. Id.; see also Caruso v. Baumle, 880 So. 2d 540, 544 (Fla. 2004) (interpreting this portion
of the statute).
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damages, whether in tort or in contract.’”80 However, the statute goes on to
state that “‘[i]f a provision of this part is in conflict with any other
provision of the Florida Statutes, such other provision shall apply.’”81
Therefore, the application of § 768.76 as either a rule of law or a rule of
evidence will only arise in the event that no other statute establishes a
different rule.
The Florida Supreme Court adopted this reasoning in Caruso v.
Baumle.82 The court interpreted this portion of the statute only to
differentiate it from another statute, § 627.736.83 The latter is part of the
Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law,84 which “governs suits arising out of
motor vehicle accidents.”85 The court explained that § 627.736(3) was an
example of a statute in conflict with § 768.76 in regards to the
admissibility of collateral source contributions.86 It stated that § 627.736(3)
placed the responsibility for set off in the hands of the jury and not in the
court as in § 768.76.87 However, as Caruso dealt solely with § 627.736, the
court’s analysis of § 768.76 is purely dicta.
In the Caruso court’s analysis, Marcie’s case would be governed by
§ 768.76 and the judge, not the jury, would be exclusively responsible for
any reduction of a jury award.
B. “In Which Damages Are Awarded”
A plain reading of this statutory phrase suggests that any set off is not to
be applied until after damages have been awarded. The preceding portion
of the statute, “in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of
fact,”88 supports such a reading. By affirming the trial court’s post-verdict
set off of the discounts, the Second District Court of Appeal in Goble
seemed to agree with this interpretation.89 In Thyssenkrupp, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal vitiated the need for a post-trial set off by holding
that Medicare benefits were not collateral sources under the statute.90
Therefore, the court held that the plaintiff could not present to the trier of
fact the undiscounted, billed medical costs as damages incurred by the
plaintiff, effectively and preemptively setting off—or discounting—a
jury’s damage award.
80. Caruso, 880 So. 2d at 544 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 768.71(1) (2001)) (alterations in
original).
81. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 768.71(3) (2001)) (alterations in original).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 543–46.
84. FLA. STAT §§ 627.730–.7405 (2010).
85. Caruso, 880 So. 2d at 544.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. FLA. STAT. § 768.76(1) (2010).
89. Goble v. Frohman, 848 So. 2d 406, 410 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
90. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp. v. Lasky, 868 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).
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When constrained to the facts of each case, both holdings appear
correct under the statute. However, courts outside of the Second District
Court of Appeal are incorrectly applying Thyssenkrupp to cases involving
statutory collateral source contributions, e.g., non-Medicare sources.91
Based on the holding of Thyssenkrupp, they argue that the undiscounted
billed costs represent no damage to the plaintiff and should not be
presented to the jury.92 Such an interpretation conflicts with the plain
language of the statute, which mandates that statutory collateral source
contributions are to be set off only after “liability is admitted or is
determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded.”93
C. “The Court Shall”
Florida Statutes § 768.76 mandates that “the court shall” be charged
with applying any set offs from collateral source contributions.94 This
obligation is the exclusive province of the court and not the fact-finder.95
The Florida Supreme Court endorsed this interpretation in Caruso. It
stated, “Thus, under section 768.76(1), the court reduces the jury award by
the amount of collateral source benefits.”96 In comparing § 768.76 with
§ 627.736, it also stated, “[I]n contrast to the procedure under section
768.76(1), in which the court offsets the collateral source amount, under
section 627.736(3), the trier of fact—whether judge or jury—is to offset
the amount.”97
In effect, courts expanding the holding of Thyssenkrupp to nonMedicare discounts are selectively applying § 768.76. However, statutes
are not meant to be read or applied only in part.98 These pre-award
evidentiary rulings violate both the letter and spirit of the statute.
D. “Have Been Paid”
This portion of the statute has been the subject of review in many
cases.99 It was also at the heart of the certified question from the Second
91. See supra note 39.
92. See, e.g., Transcript of Hearing at 2–6, Favazzi v. Am. Retirement Corp. (No. 502003CA-12992) (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. June 28, 2005) (hearing on defense motion in limine to exclude
billed amounts).
93. FLA. STAT. § 768.76(1) (2010).
94. Id.
95. Caruso v. Baumle, 880 So. 2d 540, 544 (Fla. 2004).
96. Id.
97. Id. (first emphasis added).
98. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1287 (Fla. 2000)
(“[S]tatute should be construed in its entirety and as a harmonious whole.” (citing Sun Ins. Off.,
Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961))); Fleischman v. Dep’t of Prof’l Reg., 441 So. 2d 1121,
1123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (“Every statute must be read as a whole with meaning ascribed to every
portion and due regard given to the semantic and contextual interrelationship between its parts.”).
99. See, e.g., Coop. Leasing, Inc. v. Johnson, 872 So. 2d 956, 959–60 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004);
Goble v. Frohman, 848 So. 2d 406, 409 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rudnick, 706 So.
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District Court of Appeal to the Florida Supreme Court in Goble.100 The
court’s answer made clear that these types of negotiated discounts do
qualify as benefits paid on behalf of the plaintiff and therefore are properly
set off under § 768.76, post-trial and by the judge.101 Most importantly, the
statute’s term “have been paid” is in the past tense. This is essential to
understanding and properly applying the statute. Set offs are only to be
applied for benefits already received, or “earned,”102 and not based on
potential future benefits.103 Therefore, because possible future discounts
have not yet been paid or earned (and may never be), courts must allow
evidence of undiscounted, billed costs of past care to establish the
reasonable costs of future care. To do otherwise would nullify this statutory
language.
Based on a plain reading of Florida Statutes § 768.76, (1) where no
other statute conflicts, (2) post-verdict, (3) the judge shall (4) reduce the
jury award by the amount of collateral source contribution already received
by the plaintiff. Therefore, to effectuate the statute’s language and purpose,
it should preclude the finder of fact from considering the value of these
collateral source contributions in determining the reasonable value of care
and a tortfeasor’s liability.
IV. THE CURRENT CONFLICT—GOBLE I, THYSSENKRUPP, AND
GOBLE II
A. The Second District Court of Appeal’s Decision in
Goble—“Goble I”
In 2003, the Second District Court of Appeal heard Goble v.
Frohman.104 Albert Goble was riding his motorcycle105 when he was hit by
Mark Frohman’s vehicle.106 Goble had insurance through an HMO,107 and
the undiscounted, billed cost of his medical care amounted to
2d 389, 390–91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
100. Goble v. Frohman, 901 So. 2d 830, 831 (Fla. 2005) (answering certified question, “Under
section 768.76 . . . is it appropriate to setoff against the damages portion of an award the amounts of
reasonable and necessary medical bills that were written off by medical providers pursuant to their
contracts with a health maintenance organization?”).
101. Id. at 833.
102. Fla. Physician’s Ins. Reciprocal v. Stanley, 452 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla.1984) (“We believe
that the common-law collateral source rule should be limited to those benefits earned in some way
by the plaintiff.”).
103. See supra notes 26–33 and accompanying text.
104. 848 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
105. Because the Florida No Fault Vehicle Act applies only to vehicles with four or more
wheels, Albert Goble did not carry PIP insurance and § 627.736 (mandating a different collateral
source rule) was not implicated. See supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text.
106. Goble, 848 So. 2d at 407.
107. Id.
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$574,554.31.108 These undiscounted, billed costs were presented as
evidence to the jury who awarded Goble the full amount in damages.109
Due to a contractual discount between his HMO and his health care
provider, the provider accepted only $145,970.76 from the HMO in full
satisfaction of the debt.110 After the jury reached an award of the full billed
costs, the trial judge granted a motion from Frohman to “set off” the
contractual discount amount under § 768.76.111
On appeal, Goble argued that these discounts were not “collateral
sources” under § 768.76 and were improperly set off.112 On cross-appeal,
Frohman challenged that he should have been able to present evidence of
the discounts to the jury.113 The Second District Court of Appeal ruled
against Goble and held that these types of discounts qualified as collateral
sources under the statute and were properly set off by the judge, posttrial.114 However, more importantly, the court ruled against Frohman and
held that evidence of collateral source benefits (specifically, discounts) was
inadmissible and that the trial judge was correct in admitting the
undiscounted, billed costs of care into evidence.115
In reaching this decision, the court cited Gormley v. GTE Products
Corp.116 for the proposition that the collateral source doctrine is both a rule
of damages and a rule of evidence.117 As a rule of evidence, it “prohibits
the admission of evidence regarding collateral sources in the liability trial
because it ‘misleads the jury on the issue of liability.’”118 The court
acknowledged Frohman’s right to challenge the reasonableness of the costs
of care.119 In support of its holding against the use of collateral source
evidence in such a challenge, the court reasoned that “there generally will
be other evidence having more probative value and involving less
likelihood of prejudice than the victim’s receipt of insurance type
benefits.”120 To further support the lack of value inherent in this evidence
of discounts, the court cited its holding in Hillsborough County Hospital
Authority v. Fernandez.121 In Fernandez, the court held that “evidence of
contractual discounts received by managed care providers is
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
1995)).

Id.
Id.
Id. at 407–08.
Id. at 408.
Id. at 407.
Id.
Id. at 410.
Id.
Gormley v. GTE Prods. Corp., 587 So. 2d 455 (Fla.1991).
Goble, 848 So. 2d at 410 (quoting Gormley, 587 So. 2d at 457).
Id. (quoting Gormley, 587 So. 2d at 458).
Id.
Id. (quoting Gormley, 587 So. 2d at 458) (emphasis added).
Id. (citing Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth. v. Fernandez, 664 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 2d DCA
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insufficient . . . to prove that nondiscounted medical bills were
unreasonable.”122
The Goble court determined that this presented a case of “great public
importance.”123 It certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court relating
only to the holding that these discounts qualified as statutory collateral
source contributions.124 It did not certify a question regarding the court’s
evidentiary holding—that the discounted billed medical costs were
inadmissible evidence for the trier of fact in determining damages.
Therefore, the evidentiary question remains unanswered.
B. The Fourth District Court of Appeal’s Holding and
Certification of Conflict in Thyssenkrupp
Later in 2003, the Fourth District Court of Appeal heard Thyssenkrupp
Elevator Corp. v. Lasky.125 Beatrice Lasky was injured while a passenger
on a Thyssenkrupp elevator126 and had health insurance provided by
Medicare.127 Thyssenkrupp challenged the trial court’s refusal to set off the
amount of the discounts between Medicare and the plaintiff’s health care
provider.128 On appeal, Thyssenkrupp asserted that the undiscounted, billed
costs were neither admissible as evidence of damages nor exempt from a
judicial set off, post trial.129 It reasoned that awarding the undiscounted,
billed costs above the negotiated prices actually paid on Lasky’s behalf
amounted to “unwarranted surplus damage” which would provide a
windfall.130 The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed and held that the
Medicare discounts were inadmissible as damages—thus barring the
plaintiff from proffering her undiscounted medical bills as evidence of past
or future damages.131
The court cited Florida Physician’s Insurance Reciprocal v. Stanley132
as “instructive” of the principal that these discounted amounts were
inadmissible as damages suffered by the plaintiff and extensively quoted
that case.133 In Stanley, the Florida Supreme Court faced the question of
122. Id. (citing Fernandez, 664 So. 2d at 1072).
123. Id.
124. Id. (“Under section 768.76 . . . is it appropriate to setoff against the damages portion of an
award the amounts of reasonable and necessary medical bills that were written off by medical
providers pursuant to their contracts with a health maintenance organization?”).
125. 868 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).
126. Id. at 548.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 548–49.
129. Id. at 549.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 550.
132. Id. at 549 (citing to Fla. Physcian’s Ins. Reciprocal v. Stanley, 452 So. 2d 514
(Fla.1984)).
133. Id.
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whether evidence of public services for future medical care was outside of
the collateral source rule and, therefore, admissible.134 The Stanley court
acknowledged that the collateral source rule was a “well settled rule of
damages.”135 However, the Stanley Court cited extensively to a holding by
the Illinois Supreme Court in Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co.136 to
support Stanley’s holding that the rule should not apply and the evidence of
discounted medical bills was admissible at trial.137 The Fourth District
Court of Appeal followed the Stanley line of reasoning and reversed the
damage award based on its belief that “[a]llowing the admission of
evidence of the excess discharged by Medicare payment has the effect of
‘provid[ing] an undeserved and unnecessary windfall to the plaintiff.’”138
Lasky moved for a re-hearing and argued that the court’s holding would
allow for the set off of Medicare discounts as a collateral source, which
they are explicitly not under statute.139 In denying the motion, the court
acknowledged the confusion and clarified any “misapprehension” about the
precise holding.140 It stated that the holding was evidentiary and that the
undiscounted, billed amount was inadmissible as “not tend[ing] to prove
that the claimant has suffered any loss by reason of the charge.”141 The
court certified conflict with Goble but noted that, “One could argue there is
no conflict with Goble v. Frohman . . . which involved HMO benefits
rather than Medicare. To the extent that HMO benefits and Medicare
benefits are interchangeable for this subject, however, we certify
conflict.”142
With due respect to the court, this Note argues that to no extent are
HMO benefits and Medicare benefits interchangeable for this subject.
HMO benefits are statutorily defined collateral sources143 and Medicare
benefits are specifically excluded as such.144 The court could have avoided
conflict by expressly limiting its holdings to non-statutory collateral source
contributions. By not doing so, the court’s certification statement
unnecessarily created a potential conflict.

134. Stanley, 452 So. 2d at 515. All of the referenced material noted herein from Stanley was
quoted in the Thyssenkrupp case in support of the latter’s holding.
135. Id. at 515 (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. Id. at 515–16 (citing Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 392 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1979)).
137. Id.at 516. (“‘In a situation in which the injured party incurs no expense, obligation, or
liability, we see no justification for applying the [collateral source] rule.’” (quoting Peterson, 392
N.E.2d at 5)).
138. Thyssenkrupp, 868 So. 2d at 550 (quoting Stanley, 452 So. 2d at 515).
139. Id. (Farmer, C.J., reh’g denied).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 551.
142. Id. at 551 n.1.
143. See FLA. STAT. § 768.76(2)(a)(2) (2010).
144. FLA. STAT. § 768.76(2)(b) (2010).
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It is of note that the reliance on Stanley is questionable since it was
decided prior to the enactment of § 768.76.145 Stanley is also
distinguishable because it involved the defendant’s ability to challenge the
reasonableness of damages and not the plaintiff’s right or ability to
establish reasonable damages.146 This is significant because in a situation
such as Stanley, a defendant will be challenging evidence a plaintiff has put
forth; however, in a situation such as Thyssenkrupp, a plaintiff will be
foreclosed from putting forth the same evidence to begin with.
Additionally, in 2008, the Illinois Supreme Court overruled Peterson, a
case the Stanley court heavily relied upon it in holding.147 It held that
Peterson was “incompatible with the reasonable-value approach adopted
by this court.”148 In fact, it cited both Goble I and Gormley in support of its
holding that in reasonable value jurisdictions, “the evidentiary component
[of the collateral source rule] prevents ‘defendants from introducing
evidence that a plaintiff’s losses have been compensated for, even in part,
by insurance.’”149 Despite these questions regarding the authority relied on
by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Thyssenkrupp, the holding
remains in place.150
C. The Supreme Court’s Answer to the Second District Court of
Appeal—Goble II
In 2005, The Florida Supreme Court answered the question certified by
the Second District Court of Appeal in Goble I.151 The court held that the
discounts fit within the statutory definition of collateral sources.152 As
such, the amount of the discounts was properly set off against the jury’s
award of compensatory damages post trial.153 The court reasoned that
acceptance of the discounted amounts by the provider “fully discharged”
Goble’s obligations and were, therefore, “a benefit” falling within the
intent of § 768.76.154
The certified question dealt only with the issue of whether these
discounts qualified as collateral sources to be set off by the court. It did not
145. Stanley was decided in 1984 while § 768.76 was not enacted until 1986.
146. See Fla. Physician’s Ins. Reciprocal v. Stanley, 452 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1984).
147. Wills v. Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1031 (Ill. 2008).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1032–33 (quoting Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 852 (Ill. 2005)).
150. This Note does not question the validity of either Goble I or Thyssenkrupp in holding that
these negotiated discounts are properly off-set by the court, post award. The issue is focused on the
contrasting applications of § 768.76 as an evidentiary rule and whether the finders of fact should be
presented with the undiscounted—or “total cost”—of care (Goble I) or the discounted, “actual
cost” of care (Thyssenkrupp).
151. Goble v. Frohman, 901 So. 2d 830, 831 (Fla. 2005).
152. Id. at 833.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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inquire into the evidentiary standard applied by the trial court, which
excluded the evidence of the discounted medical bills. The court’s answer
that “[t]he trial court, therefore, properly applied section 768.76 to reduce
Goble’s damages by the amount of the discounts,”155 could be read as an
approval of the evidentiary standard employed by the same trial court.
However, as this was not the question addressed, any such reading, while
logical, would be pure conjecture.
As they stand, the Goble I and Thyseenkrupp decisions are being read
by some courts to be in conflict regarding the application of § 768.76 as a
rule of evidence. Thus, they require clarification.
V. THE CURRENT CONFUSION: EXPANDING APPLICATION OF
THYSSENKRUPP
This Note’s author distributed a survey to plaintiff and defense
attorneys across the state. The survey asked for first-hand observations of
how the conflict is playing out in the lower courts. Additionally, hearing
transcripts and judicial orders were analyzed to gain insight into the
thoughts of judges who hear these cases and motions. The results of the
analysis and the responses from those familiar with this issue were eyeopening.
Respondents confirmed that some circuit courts are expanding the
evidentiary holdings of Thyssenkrupp to non-Medicare cases and
precluding evidence of the undiscounted, billed costs of care.156 This
results in the introduction of evidence of discounted medical bills to the
trier of fact—in contravention of §768.76. In the opinion of many plaintiff
attorneys who are seeing the current confusion play out across the state, the
expansive application is creating a bias against plaintiffs, resulting in an
inability to sufficiently prove future damages.157 Defense attorneys
endorsing the application of Thyssenkrupp to non-Medicare cases assert
that any bias created is vitiated by other evidence (e.g., expert testimony)
that the plaintiff may use to establish the reasonable costs of future care.158
Without clear guidance from the appellate courts, circuit judges are subject

155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Interview with Rich Barry, Attorney, Gray Robinson (Jan. 21, 2010) (on file
with author); Interview with Sean C. Domnick, Partner, Domnick & Shevin (Jan. 15, 2010) (on file
with author); Interview with Mariano Garcia, Partner, Gonzalez & Garcia (Jan. 15, 2010) (on file
with author); Interview with Spencer Kuvin, Partner, Leopold & Kuvin (Jan. 19, 2010) (on file with
author); Interview with Nancy La Vista, Attorney, Lytal, Reiter Clark Fountain and Williams (Jan.
15, 2010) (on file with author); Interview with William H. Pincus, Law Offices of William H.
Pincus (Jan. 18, 2010) (on file with author); Interview with Jeffrey R. Rollins, Attorney, Steinger,
Iscoe & Greene, P.A. (Jan. 16, 2010) (on file with author).
157. See supra note 5.
158. See, e.g., Interview with Rich Barry, Attorney, Gray Robinson (Jan. 21, 2010) (on file
with author).
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to attorneys arguing on both sides.159
A. In the Trenches: The Practitioners’ View
Plaintiff attorneys had strong opinions on this issue and, based on the
proportion of responses to the survey, were eager to share them.160
Regarding the perception that courts expanding Thyssenkrupp create a bias
against plaintiffs, one respondent stated that, “[D]isparity in apparent costs
creates confusion and the illusion that the plaintiff is overreaching with
regard to future care.”161 Another stated that, “[T]he jury will be left
wondering why the past medical bills are so low and the future medical
bills are so high.”162 Another stated that, “They [jurors] think the plaintiff
is being greedy but in reality the plaintiff probably can’t get insurance.”163
Another stated that, “[T]he jury is prevented from on its own deciding
what amount of medical bills is reasonable and necessary and sees only a
deflated amount of medical expenses incurred.”164
Regarding the inconsistency among the courts, one respondent stated
that, “There is inconsistency from judge-to-judge in every county wherein I
practice, from Broward County up to Indian River County, FL.”165 Another
respondent put it more bluntly and stated that, “[It’s] a crap shoot which
judge you are assigned to and it [affects] the likely award not only of past
medicals but of other damages as well.”166
These opinions reflect the concern of Marcie’s attorney and each of the
plaintiff attorneys who responded to the survey. The consensus is that
where benefits may or may not be available to a plaintiff in the future,
courts applying Thyssenkrupp in cases involving statutorily-defined
collateral sources are penalizing plaintiffs and enabling de facto reductions
in future damage awards by allowing prior, discounted medical bills to
artificially deflate the value of potential undiscounted medical bills in the
159. See, e.g., Transcript of Hearing, supra note 92.
160. Responses numbered thirteen from plaintiff attorneys and three from defense attorneys.
Initial survey distribution was to an equal number of plaintiff and defense attorneys. However,
because the survey was available on an open Internet website and the initial survey recipients were
encouraged to share the survey with others, the precise number of total, or proportional, recipients
is not available.
161. Interview with Mariano Garcia, Partner, Gonzalez & Garcia (Jan. 15, 2010) (on file with
author).
162. Interview with Sean C. Domnick, Partner, Domnick & Shevin (Jan. 15, 2010) (on file
with author).
163. Interview with Nancy La Vista, Attorney, Lytal, Reiter Clark Fountain & Williams (Jan.
15, 2010) (on file with author).
164. Interview with Jeffrey R. Rollins, Attorney, Steinger, Iscoe & Greene, P.A. (Jan. 16,
2010) (on file with author).
165. Id.
166. Interview with William H. Pincus, Law Offices of William H. Pincus (Jan. 18, 2010) (on
file with author).
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future.167 Of those who responded, few disagreed with the holding of
Thyssenkrupp when restricted to cases involving discounts to Medicare.168
They do, however, take issue with trial courts who are refusing to admit the
billed costs of care in non-Medicare cases based on the holdings in
Thyssenkrupp.
Much like one would expect in a judicial hearing on this issue, defense
attorneys who responded to the survey put forth many reasonable counter
arguments. Most commonly, they asserted that any possible bias is
nullified by plaintiffs’ attorneys using other mechanisms to establish the
reasonable costs of care.169 As one respondent stated, “[Bias] is a
possibility, but I doubt it. Plaintiff’s [sic] typically have an expert of some
sort (or several experts) explain in minute detail all of the future medical
expenses the injured party faces.”170 On this point, plaintiff attorneys who
responded generally stated that such experts have the possibility of
confusing the lay jury.171 One defense attorney had more faith in the jury
and stated, “I don’t think that just because a plaintiff has only ‘incurred’
$145,000 in bills for their [sic] profound injuries [it] will make the jury any
less inclined to believe the future damages experts.”172 This is indicative of
the pattern of trust that was apparent in the survey responses, with plaintiff
attorneys less confident a jury could find their way through the weeds.
The survey confirmed that this is an issue being faced by practitioners
throughout the state. With no uniform standard, the result is that court time
is being spent hearing motions, countermotions, answers, and answers to
answers that would be unnecessary if there were a clear rule. Rules of
evidence exist, in part, to prevent exactly this result.173 Brilliant attorneys
on both sides are admirably pursuing their client’s interests by persuading
judges. Unfortunately, the result is that judges are not only in conflict with
each other but often in conflict with themselves.

167. See supra notes 5, 157 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Interview with Spencer Kuvin, Partner, Leopold & Kuvin (Dec. 8, 2010) (on file
with author). This Note, too, does not impugn courts restricting Thyssenkrupp to Medicare cases.
169. See, e.g., Interview with Rich Barry, Attorney, Gray Robinson (Jan. 21, 2010) (on file
with author).
170. Id.
171. See generally Interview with Sean C. Domnick, Partner, Domnick & Shevin (Jan. 15,
2010) (on file with author); Interview with Mariano Garcia, Partner, Gonzalez & Garcia (Jan. 15,
2010) (on file with author); Interview with Spencer Kuvin, Partner, Leopold & Kuvin (Jan. 19,
2010) (on file with author); Interview with Nancy La Vista, Attorney, Lytal, Reiter Clark Fountain
and Williams (Jan. 15, 2010) (on file with author); Interview with William H. Pincus, Law Offices
of William H. Pincus (Jan. 18, 2010) (on file with author).
172. Interview with Rich Barry, Attorney, Gray Robinson (Jan. 21, 2010) (on file with author).
173. 1CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 4:15 (3d ed.
2007) (“The court’s time is a public commodity that should not be squandered. Witnesses and jurors
have private lives and ought not be asked to give more of their time than is necessary to resolve
disputes.”).
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B. In the Trenches: A View from the Bench
The Honorable David F. Crow is a circuit court judge in the Fifteenth
Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County.174 In June 2005, Judge
Crow heard arguments from counsel on a defense motion in limine to
exclude the undiscounted, billed amounts of plaintiff’s past medical
care.175 The case involved a plaintiff who benefitted from discounts
between his HMO and his health care provider.176 Judge Crow justified his
denial of the defense’s motion, using similar reasoning as this Note, based
largely on his plain reading of the statute and his interpretation of Goble I,
Thyssenkrupp, and Goble II.
In response to the defense’s assertion that the discounts represented
“phantom damages,”177 Judge Crow stated,
Counsel, I agree with what you are saying, but how do I get
around the Supreme Court? If I’m going to do this [apply a set
off] post trial as a collateral source, then the total bill has to
come in otherwise the Supreme Court decision makes no
sense at all, does it?178
After defense counsel inferred that the legislature may alter the statute
in some way,179 Judge Crow replied, “I understand. We got one [statute]
now, so obviously the legislature intends those matters [collateral sources]
to be reduced post trial. I mean, there’s no other purpose of that statute.”180
Defense counsel then asserted that contractual discount collateral sources
should be distinguished from other collateral sources under the statute.181
To wit, a seemingly frustrated Judge Crow summarized as follows:
Whatever, okay. By definition it seems to me the legislature
has decided certain benefits, okay? They are not going to
allow double recovery for that [discounts], so therefore the
Court is to reduce the verdict post trial by those amounts that
are to be paid by those collateral sources. If in fact, I’m going
to do that before trial, then that statute is completely
worthless. I mean, why do you got a statute that reduces it
post trial if you’re going to do it pretrial? . . . Then I have got
174. Judge David F. Crow, 15th Judicial Circuit of Florida, http://15thcircuit.co.palmbeach.fl.us/web/guest/judges/crow (last visited Sept. 23, 2010).
175. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 92.
176. Id. at 2.
177. Id. at 7.
178. Id. at 6.
179. Id. at 10 (“That’s a good question. After this case, we’ll see what the legislation [sic] does
with the statute.”).
180. Id.
181. Id. (“There’s also other collateral sources that come into play, Your Honor. I mean, you
know, the disability insurance or other factors that wouldn’t necessarily be reduced.”).
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a statute there that means nothing. It’s worthless.182
This reasoning by Judge Crow comports with the plain reading of the
statute advanced in this Note.183 In denying defense’s motion, Judge Crow
applied the evidentiary standard from the Second District Court of Appeal
in Goble I and allowed the undiscounted, billed costs into evidence.184 His
ruling was possibly made with personal reluctance based on a closing
remark to defense counsel,
I could argue with you all day about it. I wouldn’t necessarily
disagree with you, but that’s the way it should be; but I’m not
the legislature and I’m not the Supreme Court; and I think
[Goble II] makes it very clear that these things, if they are
collateral sources under the statute, that I am to make that
deduction post trial in accordance with [Goble II] and Judge
Lewis’ concurring opinion.185
Nothing in the holdings of Goble I, Thyssenkrupp, or Goble II has
changed since that hearing in 2005. However, at least one survey
respondent believes that Judge Crow is now a “Thyssenkrupp Man.”186
When presented with a motion in limine surrounded by similar facts as
those in the above hearing,187 Judge Crow now disallows the undiscounted,
billed costs from being admitted into evidence.188 The Honorable Judge
Crow is just an example of the many judges who are issuing these types of
contrasting opinions on this issue. Another judge in the Fifteenth Circuit,
the Honorable Kenneth Stern, was presented with this issue in Wiener v.
Miller.189 On April 10, 2007, Judge Stern granted a defense motion in
limine to preclude the undiscounted, billed amounts from being entered
into evidence.190 Upon hearing a motion for reconsideration filed by the
plaintiff, however, the court reversed the prior ruling.191
182. Id. at 10–11 (emphasis added).
183. See supra Part III.
184. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 92, at 12.
185. Id. at 11–12 (emphasis added).
186. Interview with Spencer Kuvin, Partner, Leopold & Kuvin (Jan. 19, 2010) (on file with
author).
187. Specifically, discounts between an HMO and a health care provider.
188. Eg. Order Regarding Medical Bill Amounts Admissible at Trial, Boone v. Morgan
Stanley Real Estate Advisor, Inc., No. 50-2009CAU18048XXXXMB AG (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Feb.
25, 2010).
189. Order on Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of Defendants Motion in Limine
Regarding Medical Bills, Wiener v. Miller, No. 502006CA005313XXXXMB (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct.
June 28, 2007).
190. Id.
191. Id. (“The Court has reviewed its prior ruling 4/10/07 Granting Defendant’s Motion in
Limine regarding medical bills. It is the ruling of this Court that the Plaintiff shall be permitted to
introduce at trial his total medical bills subject to a post-verdict set-off for contractual insurance
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Lest it be thought that this inconsistency is limited to the Fifteenth
Judicial Circuit of Florida, orders granting similar defense motions in
limine have also been found in the Eighth Judicial Circuit,192 the Eleventh
Judicial Circuit,193 and the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit.194 In October 2005,
the Honorable Judge Brandt Downey III from the Sixth Circuit applied the
standard from Goble but took the opportunity to articulate his frustration in
stating, “We know what the cases are. We know the cases are not giving us
as bright lined [of] a direct guidance as we would like, and that’s
unfortunate, but that’s what we have to live with sometimes.”195
Judges and attorneys alike should not be forced to simply live with it
and spend the court’s time arguing an issue that could easily be resolved by
the Florida Supreme Court or the Florida Legislature.
VI. SOLUTION IN THE LEGISLATURE OR THE COURT?
Both the Florida Legislature and the Florida Supreme Court are capable
of resolving the confusion. The Legislature could amend § 768.76 if it felt
the statute was not being applied in accordance with the legislative
intent.196 If the court were presented with a case on point, it could issue a
clear holding on the same matter. For the reasons set forth above and
below, clarification from the Florida Supreme Court would be the more
appropriate measure.
A. Amending Florida Statutes § 768.76: An Unnecessary Solution
At least one commentator who follows this issue proposes that
clarification would be best accomplished by legislative action.197 This
commentator proposes three possible alternatives for amendment of the
“defective” statute.198 The three alternatives are as follows: (1) that
Medicare and HMO discounts are to be treated differently as evidence; 199
adjustment amounts that were accepted by Plaintiff’s medical providers.”).
192. Order Granting Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Limit Medical Expenses Introduced into
Evidence at 1, Stone v. Univ. of Fla. Bd. of Trs., No. 01-05-CA-4098 K (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct. Oct. 16,
2009).
193. Omnibus Order on Motions in Limine at 5, Slavin v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., No. 06-954
CA 11 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Feb. 23, 2009).
194. Order on Defendant’s Motions in Limine at 1, Young v. Gray, No. 03-CA 8295 A (Fla.
13th Cir. Ct. Nov. 14, 2005).
195. Transcript of Hearing at 74, Saia v. Arrango, No. 02-8175-CI-15 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Oct.
11, 2005).
196. The statute has, in fact, been amended three times—in 1993, 1997, and 1999.
197. Lawrence Scott Kibler, Regarding Compensation for Past Medical Expenses, FLA. BAR
HEALTH LAW SEC. NEWSLETTER (The Fla. Bar Health Law Section), Oct. 2007, at 4.
198. Id. at 17–18.
199. Id. at 18. The commentator eschews this solution for fear of equal protection challenges.
As previously addressed, such equal protection challenges have been unsuccessful on very similar
matters. American Legion Post No. 57 v. Leahy, 681 So. 2d 1337 (Ala. 1996), is cited by the
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(2) that both should be admissible and subject to set off; and (3) that both
should be inadmissible and juries should see only the discounted
amounts.200 Each solution suffers from the same misplaced notion that a
lack of clarity of the current statute frustrates its purpose.
While this Note posits that the statute is clear and unambiguous, the
above-mentioned commentator believes that “[t]he current version of the
set off statute is ambiguous and, at best, defective.” 201 He asserts that the
evidentiary holding of Goble is contrary to the legislative intent of the
statute.202 In support of this assertion, he claims that the statute was
intended to provide set off of “traditional collateral sources” and that the
drafters did not contemplate “contractual discounts.”203 However,
discounts were commonplace at the time the statute was enacted. 204 Even
assuming, arguendo, that the Legislature did not contemplate these
discounts during drafting, discounts have been a growing practice for the
twenty-plus years since. 205 The legislature could have amended the statute
if legislators felt it was not being applied in harmony with the intent.206 It
has chosen not to with respect to this issue.
Furthermore, the legislature defined “collateral sources” based on the
contribution source when it distinguished between public sources such as
Medicare and private sources such as HMOs. 207 It could have provided
further definition by distinguishing contribution types such as negotiated
discounts, contractual discounts, non-discounted bills, co-payment
amounts, or “write offs.” However, these are just a few of the many types
of contributions offered by collateral sources.208 To provide clarity, any
amended legislation would first need to identify every contribution type
from every contribution source. It would then need to classify whether each
type is a collateral source subject to set off. Not only would such
exhaustive revision be cumbersome for legislators, it would create a
commentator as evidence that a statute similar to Florida’s was ruled unconstitutional as “violative
of the Equal Protection and Due Process guarantees” of Alabama’s constitution. Kibler, supra note
197, at 17, 19 n.65. However, as mentioned previously, the Alabama Supreme Court overruled
Leahy in Marsh v. Green, 782 So. 2d 223 (Ala. 2000). See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying
text.
200. Kibler, supra note 197, at 18.
201. Id. at 17.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 18.
204. See Sorensen, supra note 22, at 469.
205. Id.
206. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
207. FLA. STAT. § 768.76(2) (2010).
208. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., YOUR
MEDICARE BENEFITS, available at http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/10116.pdf
(listing benefits available under the program); see also BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF FLA.,
BLUEPRINT FOR HEALTH, available at http://www.bcbsfl.com/DocumentLibrary/ProductsServices/
BlueprintforHealthBrochure_65758B.pdf (detailing a common insurance plan for Florida residents).
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logistical nightmare for jurists who are charged with applying these set
offs.
In essence, those who agree with this solution would ask the legislature
not to clarify the statute but to change it entirely. Whereas courts are now
forced to litigate over this one type of contribution (discounts), even the
most exhaustive revision would likely engender even more litigation
relating to contribution types not identified in any amendment. Such a
solution seems drastic when there is a more reasonable method available in
the Florida Supreme Court.
B. Clarification by the Florida Supreme Court: The Proper
Solution
The Florida Supreme Court could provide clarification by specifying an
evidentiary standard based on the current statute. The court has analyzed
§ 768.76 on at least two occasions and has not struggled with interpreting
and applying the statutory language.209 The court in Goble II articulated
that its “guiding purpose in construing this statute is to give effect to the
Legislature’s intent.”210 It then stated that in discerning intent, it “first
look[s] to the language used in the statute.”211 It concluded its analysis by
stating that if terms are not provided a definition, their “plain and ordinary
meaning generally can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary.”212
In concluding that these discounts are collateral sources under the
statutory definition,213 the Goble II court needed little more than a
Webster’s Dictionary to interpret the statute’s terms.214 Similarly, the
Caruso court confidently interpreted and applied the procedure for set off
under § 768.76.215 It clearly stated that “under section 768.76(1), the court
reduces the jury award by the amount of collateral source benefits.”216
These two parts of the statute are at the center of the present conflict.
Given the court’s past interpretation and application of these two parts of
§ 768.76 individually, doing the same in para materia seems the most
efficient solution.
Clarification by the court would also prevent the exhaustiveness
problem that statutory revision would present.217 It would also be less
drastic than statutory revision and likely less lecherous of the state’s
resources to accomplish the goal. Such a clarification by the Florida
209. See, e.g., Goble v. Frohman, 901 So. 2d 830, 831 (Fla. 2005); Caruso v. Baumle, 880 So.
2d 540, 543–44 (Fla. 2004).
210. Goble, 901 So. 2d at 832 (citing State v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 105, 109 (Fla. 2002)).
211. Id. (citing Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432, 435 (Fla. 2000)).
212. Id. at 833 (citing Seagrave v. State, 802 So. 2d 281, 286 (Fla. 2001)).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Caruso v. Baumle, 880 So. 2d 540, 543–44 (Fla. 2004).
216. Id. at 544.
217. See supra Part VI.A.
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Supreme Court would settle the issue and be binding on all courts who are
now spending time and resources on motions and hearings arguing both
sides.
VII. LET’S BE “REASONABLE”: THE RULES OF EVIDENCE AND
FUTURE DAMAGES
Florida is a “reasonable value” jurisdiction where plaintiffs are entitled
to recover the reasonable costs of care.218 This is true even with § 768.76
limiting the ultimate recovery of past damages to the actual amount paid on
the plaintiff’s behalf.219 Florida may be in the minority of “reasonable
value” jurisdictions that, by statute, limit recovery to the actual amount
paid,220 but this Note takes no issue with set offs under § 768.76 being
applied to past damages. However, because of Florida’s rules of evidence
and longstanding law against setting off future damages,221 applying the
Thyssenkrupp standard to statutory collateral sources would threaten
Florida’s “reasonable value” status.
A. Florida’s Evidence Code and “Reasonableness”
The Florida Evidence Code mandates the relevant evidence that
Marcie’s lawyer may introduce to establish the reasonably anticipated costs
of future care.222 This can include, among other mechanisms, expert
witnesses.223 For Marcie, the best expert to establish these reasonable costs
would be the same doctor who provided her prior treatment. Marcie may
still be able to call upon her doctor to testify as to reasonableness in a court
applying Thyssenkrupp. However, her attorney fears that any testimony
regarding the undiscounted, retail costs of future care from Marcie’s doctor
would be contradictory to the discounted bills improperly allowed into
evidence. The result of which would be either jury confusion, a de facto
showing of insurance coverage, or a jury assumption that the doctor is
disingenuous about the true costs of future care.
It is the opinion of many practitioners surveyed that such a restriction
“handicap[s]”224 Marcie from the very start by preventing her from
establishing reasonableness through the expert most knowledgeable of her
condition. Even though Marcie may produce other relevant evidence to
218. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
220. See Robinson v. Bates, 828 N.E.2d 657, 669–70 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (discussing
recovery jurisdictions and putting Florida in the “minority” (citing Coop. Leasing v. Johnson, 872
So. 2d 956 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004))).
221. See infra Part VII.A–B.
222. FLA. STAT. §§ 90.401–.402 (2010).
223. FLA. STAT. §§ 90.702–.705 (2010).
224. See, e.g., Interview with Spencer Kuvin, Partner, Leopold & Kuvin (Dec. 8, 2009) (on file
with author).
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establish the reasonableness of her for future damages,225 the figurative
“bell has rung” once the Thyssenkrupp standard is misapplied in cases
involving statutorily defined collateral sources. Not only will the jury be
limited to considering the discounted bills, the jurors are likely to be
skeptical of Marcie’s demand when her own doctor is unable to support the
amount being requested for reasonable future damages.
Under Florida law, a defense attorney is precluded from making any
mention of the fact that a plaintiff will receive the benefit of insurance
when a jury is deciding future damages.226 Likewise, a plaintiff’s attorney
is precluded from making any mention of the fact that a plaintiff will not
receive the benefit of insurance when a jury is deciding future damages.
Some of the attorneys surveyed classified the allowance of only discounted
bills as an “end run around” the rules, with defense attorneys making de
facto showings of insurance coverage.227 They reason that juries
contrasting discounted bills with large requests for future damages will
infer that the plaintiff has or had insurance coverage.228 This de facto
showing may make a jury less inclined to award sufficient damages to an
already compensated plaintiff. Such a result would be in contravention to
the rules of evidence and exactly what the collateral source doctrine was
conceived to prevent.229
B. Reductions in Future Damage Awards Are Not Reasonable
If courts applying Thyssenkrupp to statutory collateral sources are
effectively endorsing pre-award reductions in future damages, this would
be contrary to well established law of the state. In Florida, the courts have
established that future damage awards are not to be reduced due to past
collateral source contributions.230 In Measom v. Rainbow Connection
Preschool, Inc., the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the reduction of
future damages by the trial court.231 It held that §768.76 did not allow for
set offs of future medical expenses.232 The court reasoned that in dealing
225. Id.
226. See Beta Eta House Corp., Inc. v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163, 165 (Fla.1970) (holding
existence or amount of insurance has no bearing on the issue of liability and damages and such
reference was reversible error); Gold, Vann & White, P.A. v. DeBerry, 639 So. 2d 47, 54 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1994) (“It is hornbook law that a jury should not learn of the existence of insurance coverage
or insurance limits.” (citing Melrose Nursery, Inc. v. Hunt, 443 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984);
Craft v. Kramer, 571 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990))).
227. See, e.g., Interview with Spencer Kuvin, Partner, Leopold & Kuvin (Dec. 8, 2009) (on file
with author).
228. Id.
229. See supra Part II.
230. See supra notes 26–32 and accompanying text.
231. Measom v. Rainbow Connection Preschool, Inc., 568 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. 5th DCA
1990).
232. Id.
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with past damages, it is already known what contributions were made on
the plaintiff’s behalf.233 Conversely, availability of these contributions in
the future is unknown.234 The Measom court’s reasoning is exemplified by
a plaintiff, such as Marcie, who benefited from contributions in the past
that are no longer available in the future.
Similarly, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Allstate Insurance Co.
v. Rudnick held that § 768.76 did not allow for reductions in future
damages.235 It cited its prior decision in White v. Westlund236 to support the
conclusion that “benefits ‘otherwise available’ under section 768.76(1), did
not include benefits potentially payable in the future.”237 Its holding
remained in line with Westlund that “in order to have collateral source
benefits set off against an award, those benefits must either be already
paid . . . or presently earned and currently due and owing. . . .”238 Based on
this reasoning and precedent, the court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to
reduce the plaintiff’s future damage awards.239
Based on the statements of the courts, the rules of evidence, and the
refusal to allow for reductions in future damage awards, Florida is
undoubtedly a “reasonable value” jurisdiction. If Marcie’s court applies
Thyssenkrupp and restricts her ability to establish the reasonable value of
future care, it may allow opposing counsel to circumvent the rules of
evidence and endorse a de facto reduction in her future damage award. In
that circumstance, Florida’s status as a “reasonable value” jurisdiction
would be questionable, at best.
VIII. THE SOLOMON SOLUTION: THE SUPREME COURTS OF OHIO
AND KANSAS
While Solomon himself did not actually “split the baby” for the sake of
compromise,240 the term “splitting the baby” has become a popular idiom
used in law to reflect compromise.241 Reflecting this modern parlance, the
“babies” at issue here are the medical bills that plaintiffs and attorneys
alike wish to provide to the jury, exclusively.242 In that sense, the supreme
233. Id.
234. Id. (“The statute does not purport to benefit the tortfeasor by deducting collateral sources
to which the insured may be entitled in the future.”).
235. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rudnick, 706 So. 2d 389, 390–91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“[I]n order to
have collateral source benefits set off against an award, those benefits must either be already
paid . . . or presently earned and currently due and owing . . . .” (quoting White v. Westlund, 624
So. 2d 1148, 1153 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993))(internal quotation marks omitted)).
236. 624 So. 2d at 1153.
237. Rudnick, 706 So. 2d at 390 (citing Westlund, 624 So. 2d at 1148) (emphasis added).
238. Id. at 390–91 (quoting Westlund, 624 So. 2d at 1153) (internal quotations marks omitted).
239. Id. at 391.
240. 1 Kings 3:16–28.
241. See BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 824 (2d ed. 1995).
242. See supra Part V.A.
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courts of Ohio and Kansas recently split the baby when each decided upon
the evidentiary issue presented by discounted medical bills.243 Sitting in
“reasonable value” jurisdictions,244 those courts similarly held that both the
undiscounted medical bills and the discounted medical bills may be
admitted to the jury as being relevant to the “reasonable value” of care.245
On May 4, 2010, the Ohio Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Jaques v. Manton.246 Richard Jaques brought a personal-injury action
against Patricia Manton to recover for injuries he sustained in a car
accident.247 Jaques’s several medical providers billed his insurance
company a total of $21,874.80.248 These same providers accepted a
discounted amount of $7,483.91 as payment in full. 249 After a jury verdict
in favor of Jaques, Manton appealed claiming that the trial court erred by
not allowing her to present evidence of the discounted amount to the jury.
250
After losing on appeal, Manton took her case to the Ohio Supreme
Court.251 In reversing the lower appellate court, the Ohio Supreme Court
opined that, “The reasonable value may not be either the amount billed by
medical providers or the amount accepted as full payment.”252 Therefore,
the court held that the original medical bills and the discounted medical
bills are admissible as evidence of the reasonable cost of care.253
One month later, on June 4, 2010, the Kansas Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Martinez v. Milburn Enterprises, Inc.254 Karen
Martinez filed suit against Milburn Enterprises after she slipped and fell
while shopping.255 After back surgery, Martinez’s provider billed her
insurance company a total of $70,496.15.256 The provider accepted a
discounted amount of $5,310 as payment in full.257 Antithetically to the
trial court’s holding in Jaques,258 here, the trial court granted a defendant’s

243. Martinez v. Milburn Enters., Inc., 233 P.3d 205, 208 (Kan. 2010); Jaques v. Manton, 928
N.E.2d 434, 439 (Ohio 2010).
244. Martinez, 233 P.3d at 208; Jaques, 928 N.E.2d at 438.
245. Martinez, 233 P.3d at 208; Jaques, 928 N.E.2d at 439.
246. Jaques, 928 N.E.2d at 434.
247. Id. at 436.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 438 (citing Robinson v. Bates, 857 N.E.2d 1195, 1200 (Ohio 2006)).
253. Id. at 439.
254. Martinez v. Milburn Enterprises, Inc., 233 P.3d 205, 205 (Kan. 2010).
255. Id. at 208.
256. Id.
257. Id. (noting that due to contractual discounts with the insurer, the hospital wrote off the
balance of $65,186.15).
258. Jaques, 928 N.E.2d at 436–37 (holding that the defendant could not admit evidence of the
discounted bills).
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motion to limit the evidence to the discounted amount.259 Martinez filed an
interlocutory appeal to the Kansas Court of Appeals, which the Kansas
Supreme Court transferred to its own docket.260 The court framed the issue
as whether the collateral source rule bars evidence of the undiscounted
billed amount or the discounted amount.261 In reversing the decision of the
trial court, the Kansas Supreme Court employed similar reasoning to that
in Jaques and held that, “[T]he rule does not bar either type of evidence;
both are relevant to prove the reasonable value of the medical treatment,
which is a question for the finder of fact.”262
The jurisdictional differences between Florida, Ohio, and Kansas make
this solution unsuitable for Florida. This is not to say that there are no
similarities between the three states in regard to the statutory and common
law on this topic. Florida, Ohio, and Kansas are all reasonable value
jurisdictions.263 All three states employ their own versions of the collateral
source rule.264 However, the collateral source rule is founded in statute in
Florida and Ohio265 while the Kansas rule is in the common law.266
Furthermore, neither Ohio nor Kansas have a post-verdict judicial set off
mandate as Florida does in § 768.76.267 These differences outweigh the
similarities and make splitting the baby an inappropriate solution for
Florida’s current conflict.
First, Florida Statutes § 768.76 clearly designates the judge, not the
jury, as the ultimate arbiter of the value of collateral source
contributions.268 Second, this solution may still result in de facto
reductions in future damages based on evidence of discounted medical
bills, inapposite to the aforementioned history of Florida law protecting the
integrity of those awards.269 Third, this solution would fly in the face of
Florida’s bar on the jury’s knowledge of insurance.270 Finally, this solution
259. Martinez, 233 P.3d at 208.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See supra notes 68–69, 244 and accompanying text.
264. FLA. STAT. § 768.76 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.20 (West 2010); Thompson v.
KFB Ins. Co., 850 P.2d 773, 776–78 (Kan. 1993).
265. FLA. STAT. § 768.76 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.20 (West 2010).
266. Thompson, 850 P.2d at 776–78 (holding statutory collateral source abrogation an
unconstitutional violation of equal protection and discussing three other attempts by the Kansas
legislature to “override or limit the common-law rule”).
267. Ohio has statutory set off provisions for certain types of claims but none for general tort
claims. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.05 (West 2009) (claims against political subdivisions);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.54(H)(2) (West 2008) (claims involving worker’s compensation). The
most recent attempt by the Kansas Legislature to create a statutory set off mandate was struck as
unconstitutional by the Kansas Supreme Court in Thompson. 850 P.2d at 782.
268. See supra Part III.C.
269. See supra Part VII.B.
270. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
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may still serve to prejudice a plaintiff such as Marcie who will not enjoy
the benefit of those discounts in the costs of her future care. For all of these
reasons, Florida ought to resist the parlance of the times and follow the true
wisdom of Solomon by not splitting this baby.
IX. CONCLUSION
The holdings of the Second District Court of Appeal in Goble I and the
Fourth District Court of Appeal in Thyssenkrupp are both correctly decided
under Florida Statutes § 768.76. They are distinguishable in that Goble
addressed a statutorily defined collateral source (HMO benefits) while
Thyssenkrupp addressed a statutorily defined non-collateral source
(Medicare). This often-overlooked distinction is resulting in many
plaintiffs being foreclosed from establishing the reasonable costs of future
care without the prejudice of discounts that may no longer be available to
them in the future. The impact of this issue is two-fold. First, a confusion
in the trial courts stemming from an apparent lack ofclear direction.271
Second, a concern among the attorneys stemming from the application of
differing evidentiary standards among courts within the same
jurisdiction.272
To resolve the confusion, it is necessary that the Florida Supreme Court
accept jurisdiction on a case that asks the question: Does Florida Statutes
§ 768.76 bar evidence of statutorily-defined collateral source contributions,
including discounts, to establish the reasonable costs of care and a
tortfeasor’s liability? If the answer is yes, Thyssenkrupp must be limited to
cases of Medicare and other statutory non-collateral source contributions
and Goble limited to statutory collateral source contributions. If the answer
is no, then the set off portion of the statute is rendered meaningless as the
judge’s job will have been done by the jury during trial. The Florida
Supreme Court has stated that “‘a basic rule of statutory construction
provides that the Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions,
and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute
meaningless.’”273 Based on a plain reading of the statute, the relevant
holdings of the applicable cases and the desire to hold fast to this basic
rule, the only reasonable answer is “yes.” This will stay true to the
legislative intent, allow the court to prevent a windfall through post-trial
set off, and prevent bias against a plaintiff for nothing more than having
responsibly carried insurance in the past.
Perhaps Marcie will recover someday. However, if she is fortunate
enough to be made whole physically and mentally but not made whole
financially as a result of an award based on discounts she no longer
receives, it would be bittersweet, indeed.
271. See supra Part V.B.
272. See supra Part V.A.
273. Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So. 2d 360, 366 (Fla. 2005)
(quoting State v. Goode, 830 So. 2d 817, 824 (Fla. 2002)).
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